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Towards the cognitive plausibility of conceptual space 
models1
This work is focused on formal approaches in cognitive semantics, namely, the formal-
isation of the conceptual level of representations as the intermediate level between the 
symbolic and the connectivist one. An account of a selection of existing models is given. 
It is argued that one of the most important shortcomings that keeps the existing models 
from being truly cognitively plausible is the fact that they do not properly address the 
correlations between objects’ perceptible features, which are argued to be causally linked 
to the underlying, essential properties. The argumentation is supported by empirical evi-
dence, implying the existence and importance of the causal effects in categorisation and 
inductive learning. It is therefore claimed that any cognitively plausible model of semantic 
representations needs to be able to adequately describe these cognitive phenomena, which 
has not been achieved so far. The paper qualitatively sketches out a cognitively motivated 
semantic representation model based on Gärdenfors’ conceptual space theory, endowed 
with the capability of describing the correlation of surface properties, thus supporting the 
notion of psychological essentialism.
1. Introduction
Traditionally, the opposing views of describing the meaning can be summa-
rised into two major groups: the realist and the cognitive one (Raubal 2004). 
The realist approach posits that meanings are “in the world”, i.e., they exist 
independently from the observer. On the other side, the cognitive approach 
views meanings as being “in the head” of the observer, i.e., inseparable from 
a reasoning agent’s interpretation. This paper adopts the cognitive view, thus 
focusing on the cognitive representations. The representations may be defined 
as natural or constructed substates of a cognitive system that support the 
system’s purposeful interaction with its environment (Aisbett, Gibbon 2001).
1 This research was supported by a NetWordS grant – 09–RNP–089.
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A cognitively plausible model of semantic representations, describing the 
world’s image and structure within the cognitive system, has been an elusive 
target from the aspects of the cognitive science, lexical semantics, and artifi-
cial intelligence, specifically its subdomains concerning natural language pro-
cessing. Such a model, following the concepts of cognitive science, should have 
high explanatory power and provide more relevant results in tasks based on 
imitating cognitive abilities (e.g., language) than models that aim to circum-
vent the cognitive plausibility.
Gärdenfors’ (2004) conceptual space model represents an important step 
towards that end and is taken as a base model in this paper. It is argued that 
a model of cognitive semantic representations needs to address the property 
correlations and underlying conceptual theories in order to cover empirically 
supported cognitive phenomena of implicitly observing property correlations as 
an indirect basis for inductive inference. Current formal semantic representa-
tion models take into account these phenomena superficially at most. In this 
work it is argued that incorporating these important, empirically supported, 
cognitive phenomena is an important part of conceiving a cognitively motiva-
ted model of semantic representations.
Section 2 describes Gärdenfors’ conceptual space model and reports a se-
lection of attempts of its formalisation and extension. Section 3 brings forward 
theoretical and empirical findings concerning property correlations and their 
role in humans’ concept construing and inductive inference. Section 4 roughly 
sketches a model that would comply with the described cognitive phenomena, 
briefly discusses the challenges of semi–automatized extraction of its parame-
ters, and lists some of its possible applications in natural language processing. 
Section 5 concludes the paper and suggests future work.
2. Conceptual space models
There are three levels of cognitive semantic representations with respect 
to the level of abstraction (Gärdenfors 2004): connectivist (associationist), con-
ceptual and symbolic (figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1. Illustration of abstraction levels of cognitive representations:
a) associationist         b) conceptual         c) symbolic
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On the symbolic level, knowledge is abstract and cognitive processes are 
modelled as computing processes of the Turing machine. This level is most 
amenable for mathematical modelling of cognitive systems as it is appropriate 
for the application of formal, proposition or predicate, logic in symbolic manip-
ulations representing cognitive processes. 
The associationist (or connectivist) approach describes the system of 
knowledge as a densely interconnected network of primitive units. These units 
do not exhibit an explicitly expressible function; instead, they are relevant as 
a collection with emerging intelligence, the emphasis being on the types and 
strengths of their connections. The associationist approach is used in the arti-
ficial neural network modelling and computing paradigm.
The conceptual level lies between these two ends of the abstraction con-
tinuum (elaborated in Aisbett, Gibbon 2001). Cognitive semantics posits that 
meanings are mental entities, characterised by mappings from symbols to 
conceptual structures (Lakoff 1990). Thus, the concepts do have their explicit 
mean ing yet they are abstract enough for formal description and computa-
tional treatment. Neither symbolic nor associationist approach succeed in 
explaining some important cognitive phenomena, such as concept acquisition, 
similarity description, and concept combinations; the conceptual approach pro-
vides a more appropriate basis for describing these phenomena. In addition, 
the conceptual level allows for geometric modelling of semantic representa-
tions, which arguably warrants its aptness for semantic representation from 
the point of neuroscience (e.g., Gärdenfors 2004: 67).
A geometrically organised representation space such as conceptual spaces 
are perceptually grounded and therefore a highly cognitively motivated mod-
el. In contrast, formal ontologies do not entertain cognitive plausibility, but 
instead they are oriented towards necessary and sufficient conditions that an 
instance needs to satisfy to be a part of a class, which is especially apt for 
application of formal logic (Schwering 2005), thus pertaining to the symbolic 
level of semantic representations. However, some recent exceptions exist, where 
attempts are made to extend the formal ontologies with the capability to re-
present the concepts with fuzzy boundaries and prototypical structure (e.g., 
Frixione, Lieto 2014).
2.1. Gärdenfors’ conceptual space model
Gärdenfors’ (2004) conceptual space theory yields a semantically interpret-
able and computationally amenable model of conceptual representations. A 
conceptual space can be represented as a geometrically organised vector space 
spanned by different quality dimensions, such as colour, shape, size, mass, 
taste, etc. A natural property2 is defined as a convex region of a dimension 
(ibid.: 71). Convexity implies that if any two values are members of a set, 
then all values between them are also members of the set. (The relation of 
“between ness” must also be defined for the observed system.)
2 The terms “quality dimension” and “property” will thus be used interchangeably through-
out the paper.
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A concept is a region within the conceptual space, representing a multi–pro-
perty matrix. For example, a concept of apple is composed of certain regions 
of the quality dimensions of colour, shape, taste, etc. An object3 is an exemplar 
of the pertaining concept and can be represented as a vector. E.g., a vector 
corresponding to “this green, sour, medium–sized (…) apple” has certain values 
for colour, shape, taste, etc., which are specific property values on the pertain-
ing quality dimensions.
Similarity judgements are a prerequisite of differentiation and identifica-
tion, both the fundamental components of reasoning (Aisbett, Gibbon 2001). In 
a geometrically organised conceptual space it is possible to define the relation 
of similarity between objects in terms of a suitably defined metric of the space 
(e.g. Euclidean, as in formula (R2.1), Manhattan, or other).
(R2.1)
Concepts as regions of conceptual spaces do not conform to Aristotelian 
view of categorisation, which presupposes that the membership to a category 
is of binary character, i.e., either something is or is not a member of a cate-
gory. Instead, concepts are prototypically organised, which means that there 
are more and less typical objects of a concept.
The conceptual space theory is aligned with the tenets of cognitive seman-
tics (discussed thoroughly in Gärdenfors 2004), hence the claim that conceptual 
spaces “provide an appropriate ontology for such a semantics” (ibid.: 159). 
Also, the conceptual spaces provide a formal elaboration of concept learning, 
a crucial cognitive functionality development, as well as concept combinations. 
These properties of Gärdenfors’ theory arguably provide the legitimacy for the 
assessment of it being cognitively relevant, which was mentioned above as one 
of the primary goals of the conceptual approach of cognitive representation 
modelling generally.
2.2. Formalisations and extensions of Gärdenfors’ conceptual space formulation
There are several noteworthy proposals of formalisation and extensions of 
Gärdenfors’ conceptual space model. For example, Aisbett and Gibbon (2001) 
support and elaborate the claim that the conceptual level of representation is 
a link between the symbolic and connectivist levels. Furthermore, they provide 
a formal foundation for conceptual spaces modelled as vector spaces, geo-
metrically organised based on different domains and the convexity of regions 
pertaining to concepts. They highlight the dynamics of conceptual spaces, 
manifested through context–dependent changes of attention areas and the abil-
ity of representing complex structures and relations.
3 The terms “object” will be used interchangeably with “instance” and “exemplar”, following 
the notation in (Gärdenfors 2004). 
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Rickard (2006) also uses Gärdenfors’ theory in devising a geometrically 
structured conceptual space model as an N2–dimensional unit hypercube, 
where N is the number of quality domains spanning the space. Concepts are 
represented as points within the hypercube, while their coordinates are values 
of a graph connection matrix derived from co–occurrences of the concept’s 
properties. A similarity calculus is proposed, both for between different obser-
vations as well as between an observation and a concept.
Raubal (2004) adopts the cognitive approach to describing the meaning, 
which states that meaning is inextricable from the reasoning agent, as opposed 
to the realist approach, positing the objectivity of truthfulness regardless of 
the reasoning agent. Highlighting the semantic interoperability as a precondi-
tion of successful communication, Raubal develops a formal apparatus for de-
scription of conceptual spaces as vector spaces spanned by quality dimensions, 
as well as the mapping between conceptual spaces of communication partici-
pants (e.g., a machine and a human). Also, he uses the Euclidean distance as 
instance similarity indication to quantify their distinctiveness with regards to 
the prototypical region of a concept. This formal system is used in a navigation 
case study.
With a similar emphasis on spatial cognition and spatial information sys-
tems as a use case, Adams and Raubal (2009a) use Gärdenfors’ formulation 
and devise formalisations for metric conceptual space definition, semantic 
similarity measurement, and concept combination. The main aim of their work 
is to provide a mathematical foundation for facilitating the construction of 
conceptual space knowledge bases. They model concepts as convex polytopes, 
claiming such structures to be especially appropriate for computational opera-
tions. The system also incorporates the dimension of context, represented as 
quality domain weights. An interesting result of one of the model’s possible 
applications is a table summarising country similarities with respect to differ-
ent contexts (ibid.: 15). Building on the developed algebra, the authors propose 
the Conceptual Space Markup Language (CSML), an XML based interchange 
format facilitating the creation and sharing of conceptual structures using geo-
metric information (Adams, Raubal 2009b).
The μw–model (Galeti} 2011) is aimed at facilitating typicality quantifica-
tion. The key parameters of the model are the property weight (w) for a con-
cept (e.g. weight of colour for bird) and the typicality (μ) of the property value 
for the concept (e.g. the typicality of red for bird). An object, representing an 
instance of the pertaining concept, may then be represented as a vector, as 
shown in (R2.2).
(R2.2)
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where c is the observed instance of concept C, e1 ...en are basis vectors 
representing the concept’s quality domains (e.g. colour), x1 ...xn are the ob-
ject’s values of the respective quality dimensions (e.g., yellow), w1 ...wn are the 
weights of the respective quality domains for C, and μA1 ...μAn are the typicality 
measures of the actual property values for C. The choice of the letter μ as part 
of the notation as well as the A’s in the indices underline the reliance on the 
fuzzy set theory (Zadeh 1965) – namely, the μw–model observes the concepts 
as fuzzy sets, meaning that each object belongs to different concepts to various 
degrees with respect to each of its property values (e.g., a certain colour as-
signs to an object cx the amount of 0,69 for “apple–ness”, 0,84 for “fire truck–
ness”, 0,07 for “sparrow–ness”, etc.).
The typicality or representativeness (R) of a real or imaginary instance of 
a concept is calculated as the Euclidean distance of the vector from the coordi-
nate system origin, according to formula (R2.3). The prototypical instance has 
the maximal typicality, equal to 1.
(R2.3)
Similarly to Rickard’s model, the μw–model is also an abstraction of 
Gärdenfors’ conceptual space model, thus able to address the problem of 
representing quality dimensions that take nominal values, such as, e.g., move-
ment, consistency, diet. (For comparison, Raubal (2004) focuses only on the 
numeric variables, such as colour hue, saturation and brightness, shape factors, 
visibility, etc.) These abstract models are applicable for nominal quality dimen-
sions along with the ordinal, as they abstract the properties by representing 
them indirectly, e.g., via the w and μ parameters. However, a shortcoming of 
the μw–model arising from this abstraction is a possible loss of uniqueness of 
representation. Namely, suppose that a red pigeon and a yellow pigeon are the 
same in all respects except for their colour, and that the typicality of these 
two objects with respect to the property of colour is the same; then these two 
objects would be represented by the same vector r according to (R2.2), result-
ing also in the same typicality value R, according to (R2.3). 
2.3. The problem of correlations
Although some of the described models arguably provide a certain level of 
cognitive plausibility – e.g., Gärdenfors emphasises many cognitive processes 
that his model covers (e.g., concept acquisition, induction); the μw–model is 
based on the prototype theory (Rosch 1973), a generally supported theory in 
cognitive science and cognitive linguistics – an important problem is present in 
each of them that prevents them from being fully relevant models of cognitive 
representations and processes. Namely, many models represent quality do-
→ →
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mains as orthogonal basis vectors, i.e., quality dimensions are independent from 
each other, whereas in reality the quality dimensions are often correlated within 
a concept structure. This problem is already mentioned by Raubal (2004: 10).
It is at this point fair to acknowledge Rickard’s (2006) pioneering proposal 
of a conceptual space model providing description of correlations between dif-
ferent quality domains of a concept. The correlations are learnt from a pre-
pared training set or set explicitly, and used for coordinates of concepts within 
highly abstracted conceptual spaces. Whilst this versatile model presents a 
very valuable resource of ideas for calculation and employment of property 
correlations, it may not be used as a state–of–the–art conceptual space model 
because the conceptual structures are reshaped as points instead of convex 
regions, thus sacrificing a certain amount of cognitive plausibility.
The current paper elaborates on the phenomena on the property correla-
tions from the cognitive perspective, while also touching the notion of psycho-
logical essentialism. In the following section it brings forward a selection of 
empirical evidence emphasising these correlations as crucial for people’s ability 
of concept construing and inductive inference. It also suggests a very rough 
draft of a model that would be in line with these cognitive phenomena, whilst 
sustaining all other cognitive plausibility criteria.
3. Property correlations
It has been demonstrated that people perform poorly at detecting isolated 
correlations, whereas they are excellent at detecting multiple correlations (Bill-
man, Knutson 1996; Kornblith 1995; Jones, Smith 2002; Kloos, Sloutsky 2008; 
McClelland, Rogers 2003). The number of correlations is not the only param-
eter; systematicness of the correlations is also crucial for the ability of their de-
tection. This is empirically confirmed by Billman and Knutson’s (1996) exper-
iment, where they presented to the subjects a sequence of imaginary animals 
and asked them to predict a missing property. The sequences were characterised 
by either bundled or independent correlated feature pairs, as in figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1. Examples of systematic and unsystematic property correlations 
(taken from Billman, Knutson 1996). Left: systematic correlations – the shape 
of tail predicts the shape of body and legs, and vice versa.
Right: unsystematic correlations – three independent correlation pairs: the 
shape of tail predicts the shape of head, the texture predicts the habitat and 
the shape of body predicts the shape of legs.
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Furthermore, the natural categories (or natural kinds) are usually char-
acterised by structured, bundled property correlations (e.g. Billman, Knutson 
1996: 468; Rosch 1999; Gelman, Davidson 2013). E.g., considering the category 
“living beings”, it is obvious that the value of the property “limb” is a good 
predictor of “locomotion” as well as “covering” (e.g., having wings is a good 
predictor of having feathers and the ability to fly, with a few exceptions, which 
need to be learnt explicitly).
Taking into account the observations that people are excellent at detecting 
structured correlations and that natural kinds are abundant with them, it 
can be concluded that people are adapted for successfully categorising natural 
objects. This is confirmed by Kornblith, claiming that “the way in which we 
detect covariation is precisely tailored to the structure of natural kinds” (1995: 
102).
Natural kinds pertain to the categories of natural existence, as opposed 
to artefacts. Although artefacts also exhibit property correlations, they are not 
entertained in this theoretical development, since these correlations are of 
arbitrary nature, i.e., their properties are tailored to specific functionality that 
an artefact needs to fulfil (see, e.g., Ahn 1998). Thus for artefacts the analysis 
of property correlations and weights should rather be observed from the aspect 
of Gibson’s (1977) “affordances” than reasoning agents’ aptness for categorisa-
tion of objects based on cognitively effortless detection of property correlations.
3.1. Theory–theory
A crucial advantage of possessing the conceptual structure within the 
cognitive adaptive system is the ability to infer non–obvious properties based 
on induction originating from the information about the object’s category 
(e.g., to infer that an object is dangerous provided it is a wolf; Ahn, Luhman 
2005). In order to allow for such a capability, concepts need to be sound and 
well–structured, subsuming systematic correlations among features possessed 
by the pertaining objects.
One of the attempts to theoretically support the empirical findings that 
people are able to virtually effortlessly employ inductive inference in catego-
risation of natural kind exemplars via detected correlations is the “theory of 
theories”, or “theory–theory”. In the seminal work by Murphy and Medin 
(1985), theories are loosely defined as mental explanations relying on general 
world knowledge. Concepts are embedded in a complex network of existing 
knowledge (Ahn, Luhmann 2005), which can be represented as scientific the-
ories. People use this preliminary knowledge for the conceptually influenced 
prediction of correct categorisation.
The theories are not of arbitrary nature, but rather the result of causal 
relations between the correlated properties. A similar theoretical account is 
brought forth in Rehder’s (2009) work, stating that “[a]lthough it may be 
vague or incomplete, one often has at least some general idea of the type of 
causal mechanisms that produce or generate a particular property”. A question 
that naturally arises is the question of expertise, namely, whether it suffices to 
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have an appropriate level of expertise in order to be able to create and employ 
the theories in inductive inference. For example, Quine (1969) reports that 
children rely exclusively on perceptually based similarity metrics in categorisa-
tion tasks (reported, e.g., in Murphy, Medin 1985: 290), whereas adults employ 
implicit knowledge that can be explained by the “theory–theory”. 
In addition, Murphy and Medin (1985) claim that children develop so–called 
“proto–theories” as early as aged two. Gelman and Markman (1986) concur 
by providing evidence that children as young as four tend to overrule the 
perceptual similarity in favour of the category membership information in 
inductive inference tasks. Gelman and Davidson (2013) empirically show that 
young children rely more on category membership than perceptual similarity, 
but only in case of natural kinds, which possess a well–developed conceptual 
structure. Furthermore, according to Murphy and Medin’s (1985) “theory of 
individuality”, children are able to correctly distinguish what kinds of objects 
receive proper names and which do not. A claim arises that people are biologi-
cally predisposed for developing theories, which is realised via perceptual and 
cognitive structures.
The “theory–theory” emphasises the role of underlying features that are 
essential for the concept coherence. Coherence of a concept indicates how 
easily one can visualise an object after removing one of its features (Sloman 
et al. 1998). For example, it is much simpler to visualise a bird that cannot 
fly than a bird that does not have a bird’s DNA or internal organs. Feature 
immutability can be modelled as centrality of a feature in a network of fea-
tures (id.).
3.2. Causal status hypothesis and psychological essentialism
In line with these accounts is the “causal status hypothesis” (Ahn et al. 
2000a and 2000b), according to which features representing causal origins are 
more significant than those that are effects. The causal status effect “is expected 
to occur in categorization because people believe objects in the same category 
share the same essence which causes their surface features and because cause 
features are believed to have more inductive power than their effects” (Ahn et 
al. 2000b: 368). The causal status hypothesis has been proven by a behav i oural 
task (ibid.) on adults, who evaluated identical features as having larger 
weight in categorisation when they served as causes than when they served 
as effects.
These theoretical accounts are shared by the philosophical notion of 
psychological essentialism, claiming that objects have essences or underlying 
natures that make them what they are. Kornblith (1995: 81) provides a 
summary of this idea, stating that “we are not at any time inclined to classify 
objects solely in virtue of their observable features, but instead take for gran-
ted that the observable features of an object are only an imperfect guide to 
their true natures”.
According to this tradition, concepts are not just a list of characteristic 
features as represented by Gärdenfors’ model and its described derivations, 
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but instead naïve theories with causally related systems of features (Smith, 
Colunga 2012). Also, an argument in favour of conceptually modelled cognitive 
representations is them being a prerequisite for the ability of predicting non-
obvious properties based on known category membership (Ahn et al. 2000b).
4. Towards a cognitively plausible conceptual space model
A system modelling cognitive representations and processes needs to be 
computationally tractable as well as take into account the property correla-
tions as they are arguably s basis for concept learning and inductive inference. 
In other words, it needs to bridge the gap between the cognitive plausibility 
and computational amenability.
Whereas the surface quality dimensions span Gärdenfors’ (2004) concep-
tual spaces and its reported derivations of it, a cognitively plausible concep-
tual space model needs to include the underlying quality dimensions that are 
causal origins of the surface dimensions. A general idea of such underlying 
quality dimensions can be provided with the following examples.
Take two objects of the concept apple, one red and sweet, another green 
and sour, as shown in figure 4.1a. If we observe more instances of the same 
concept, it is expected that they are approximately aligned along the line con-
necting the first two instances at the ends of the illustrated continuum. This 
would indicate that these properties are well correlated.
Figure 4.1. Surface and causally originating essential properties. Left 
example: a green and sour apple, and a red and sweet apple. Right example: 
a small dog with a high pitch voice, and a large dog with a low pitch voice
A well–known prerequisite for statistical inference is discerning between 
correlation and causation. The current qualitative analysis focuses on the nat-
ural kinds, whose variety is a result of the evolutionary development. From 
the ontological point of view, evolution brought about the correlations between 
natural kinds’ features. Therefore, the correlations between properties of an 
object may be assumed to result from the evolution–based causation. In the 
current example this causality is modelled as an underlying, “essential prop-
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erty X”, inherent to the natural concept, having the well–correlated surface 
properties as effect. This and other underlying properties are the underlying 
quality dimensions that should span a cognitively plausible conceptual space 
model.
Another example is shown in figure 4.1b. The two dogs represent two 
ends of the illustrative continuum of body size and voice pitch. If we observe 
additional dog instances and represent them in the same coordinate system, 
again, they would be roughly aligned along the line connecting the first two. 
These two surface properties are indicators of the underlying property, shown 
in figure 4.1b as “essential property Y”.
As reported earlier, the selection of empirical findings supporting the 
existence and importance of underlying concept theories suggests that a sound 
concept possesses a coherent structure. Such a structure indirectly brings 
about the correlation among the concept’s properties. The correlation and mu-
tual prediction of the perceptually observable surface features can be used as 
indicators of the underlying essential properties that constitute the concepts’ 
essence (e.g., “apple–ness” and “dog–ness”) upon which the conceptual theo-
ries build. It is important to observe that within such a system concepts are 
still represented as convex regions, conforming with the postulates of conceptual 
space theory as well as cognitive semantics in general. 
It is worth noting that in both examples the quality dimensions are 
named arbitrarily, by “X” and “Y”. Namely, it can be argued that language 
is tailored to the surface properties and rarely do underlying properties have 
names. Coun terexamples are mostly found in jargon of domains of expertise. 
For example, when classifying wines, experts are well–aware of naturally mo-
tivated causes that bring about the perceptual (visual and gustative) characte-
ristics of a class of wine and they are able to competently predict a property 
based on another or a set thereof (e.g., if an opaque colour is observed, the 
wine is expected to be full–bodied; if told that a wine originates from a well–
insulated terroir, a higher grape ripeness is expected).
4.1. Challenges of automated model quantification
Being aware of the plethora of currently available digital linguistic resources, a 
question arises whether it is possible to utilise them for automatic or semi–
automatic qualitative and quantitative description of the hypothesised cogni-
tively plausible model’s parameters, e.g., definition of quality dimensions and 
quantification of their weights4. Undoubtedly, any such endeavour would be 
greatly challenging as, in the first place, the model would be based on quality 
dimensions that are essentially not explicitly referred to by language, as men-
tioned previously.
One may find detecting these underlying quality dimensions as evocative 
of the Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA), which is a well–established technique 
in lexical semantics, especially in document classification and similarity quan-
4 Represented, e.g., as conceptual centrality (Sloman et al. 1998).
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tification. However, the dimensionality reduction as a crucial part of LSA is of 
questionable utilisation value for the current research as the interpretation of 
a low–dimensional result is often devoid of plausible interpretation.
However, despite these discouraging observations, there may be an avenue 
for research of automatic model quantification based on the available linguistic 
resources. Namely, since it is argued that the underlying quality dimensions 
bring about the correlations of causally resultant surface properties, it should 
be possible to use these correlations, found in corpora, as indications of the 
underlying quality dimensions. To that end, a combination of an array of com-
plementary resources may be utilised, namely, corpora (e.g., Davies 2013) for 
finding correlations, and ontologies (e.g., OpenCyc5), Wordnet6 (Miller 1995) 
and McRae’s NORMS7 for determining congruent properties and systematizing 
features as points or regions upon corresponding quality domains. Moreover, 
Rickard’s (2006) work including property correlations is likely to serve as a 
useful guideline. An empirical research may also be necessary in order to vali-
date the obtained model and provide a benchmark for model testing.
Such a research programme would bridge the gap between the two 
approaches of semantic modelling (Andrews et al. 2009): the experiential 
approach and the distributional approach. The experiential data refers to men-
tal representations with an emphasis on objects’ empirical descriptions, mak-
ing these data perceptually grounded. Exemplars of the experiential approach 
of semantic modelling are McRae’s (2005) NORMS and Gärdenfors’ (2004) 
conceptual space model spanned by perception– and experience–based quality 
domains. On the other hand, distributional data is based on the linguistic use 
of lexemes connoting concepts or exemplars thereof, thus the distributional 
approach relies heavily on the corpus linguistics.
4.2. Possible applications
An operationalised cognitively motivated conceptual space model that is 
formally described and can be quantified in an automatic or semi–automatic 
manner would provide a valuable resource for computational linguistics, with 
an emphasis on lexical semantics. Its applicability and benefit may be assessed 
in problems such as:
–  measuring the similarity between concepts, e.g., apple and orange. It 
should be noted that comparing two concepts will here be interpreted 
as comparing their prototypical objects. The traditional distributional 
semantics approach (Turney, Pantel 2010) compares the feature vectors 
representing each respective context obtained from the corpus. Incor-
porating the feature weights (and other parameters, e.g., typical ity of a 
property value for an observed concept) in this comparison should yield 
a more precise and cognitively relevant result;
5 http://www.cyc.com/platform/opencyc (accessed on 8 June 2015)
6 http://wordnet.princeton.edu/ (accessed on 8 June 2015)
7 The human–generated feature database available at: https://sites.google.com/site/kenmcrae-
lab/norms–data (accessed on 8 June 2015)
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–  distinguishing the relation of similarity (e.g. airplane–rocket) from the 
more general relation of relatedness (e.g. airplane–pilot are related, but 
not similar) – once a distributional method extracts a pair of related 
concepts, a conceptual space model may be used to refine the relation by 
elimination method as it covers only similarity, (thus far) not relatedness;
–  detecting semantically opaque feature–concept combinations through 
low typicality assessment (e.g., using the μw–model);
–  utilising the quantified parameter of quality dimension weight in an al-
ready existing formal semantic model, e.g., in dimensionality reduction 
process within the “distributional memory” model by Baroni and Lenci 
(2010) for the attribute–noun combinations.
5. Conclusion and future work
Gärdenfors’ conceptual space model is a thoroughly developed theoreti-
cal semantic representation model focused on the description of conceptual 
structures and quality domains that constitute them. The paper brings forth 
an overview of this as well as other similar or derived models of conceptual 
spaces, highlighting their deficiency of cognitive plausibility due to their inabi-
lity of adequate property correlation description.
It then elaborates the indispensability of property correlation awareness 
for humans’ ability of effortless categorisation, supported by a selection of 
reported empirical evidence. An approach is proposed that would yield a con-
ceptual space model taking a step further towards the cognitive plausibility 
by incorporating the correlation of properties realised via causally originating 
essential properties constituting conceptual coherence.
It is argued that the existing linguistic resources, such as ontologies, cor-
pora, and human–generated feature lists, may prove beneficial in automatic or 
semi–automatic formalisation and parameter quantification of such a model. 
The future work will provide further evidence on the applicability of these 
resources with an emphasis on text corpora, thereby bridging the gap between 
the experiential and the distributional approach in semantic modelling.
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Kognitivna plauzibilnost formalnih modela semanti~kih 
reprezentacija
Gärdenforsov model konceptualnih prostora veoma je razra|en semanti~ki model orijentiran 
opisu strukture koncepata i kvalitativnih domena koje ih sa~injavaju. U ovomu se radu daje 
pregled tog i izbor drugih sli~nih modela konceptualnih prostora te se nagla{ava nedostatnost 
njihove kognitivne plauzibilnosti uslijed zanemarivanja ili kognitivno nedosljednoga opisa 
korelacija svojstava.
Postojanje i va`nost korelacijskih u~inaka u kategorizaciji i induktivnomu u~enju potvr|eni 
su rezultatima mnogobrojnih empirijskih istra`ivanja temeljenih na kategorizacijskim i ge nera-
lizacijskim procjenama ispitanika. Dakle, svaki kognitivno vjerodostojan model semanti~kih 
reprezentacija mora uklju~ivati fenomen kognitivnoga sustava koji se odnosi na automatiziranu 
detekciju strukturiranih korelacija svojstava. Ti se korelacijski u~inci opisuju »teorijom teorijā« 
(engl. theory–theory), koja tvrdi da kognitivni sustav sadr`i mikroteorije o konceptima, a te mu 
mikroteorije omogu}avaju sposobnost automatiziranoga induktivnoga u~enja kategorizacije pri-
rodnih vrsta (engl. natural kinds) putem uo~enih korelacija me|u njihovim svojstvima.
U ovomu se radu tvrdi da su svojstva dobro strukturiranih, koherentnih koncepata uzro~no 
povezana, a ta se povezanost modelira dubinskim, uzro~no ishodi{nim kvalitativnim dimenzijama. 
Kao budu}i rad spominje se istra`ivanje mogu}nosti automatiziranog ili poluautomatiziranog 
crpljenja parametara predlo`enoga modela uporabom digitalnih jezi~nih resursa kao {to su 
ontologije, Wordnet, liste svojstava koncepata koje su generirali ispitanici temeljem osjetilnih 
iskustava, odnosno korpusi. Time bi se ostvarilo kombiniranje iskustvenih podataka s podatcima 
temeljenim na jezi~noj uporabi, {to bi tako dobiveni model ~inilo vrijednim resursom, i za 
kognitivnu znanost i lingvistiku, kao i za ra~unalnu obradu prirodnoga jezika s naglaskom na 
semantiku.
Keywords: cognitive semantics, prototype theory, categorisation, psychological essentialism, 
property correlations
Klju~ne rije~i: kognitivna semantika, teorija prototipova, kategorizacija, psihologijski 
esencijalizam, korelacija svojstava
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